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 Introduction 
 According to Philip Pettit, we should endorse “republican” liberty, free-
dom as “non-domination,” as a “supreme political value,” that is, “a 
value with a distinctive claim to the role of yardstick for our institutions” 
( Pettit 1997 , 80). 1 It is this commitment to freedom as non-domination 
that distinguishes republicanism from various forms of liberal egalitarian-
ism, including the political liberalism of John Rawls ( Rawls 2001 ,  2005 ). 
Some political liberals challenge this claim. They hold that the main ele-
ments of political liberalism can be construed as comprising a robust 
commitment to non-domination for all citizens. According to Anthony 
Laden, for instance, “there is a rather close correlation between [. . .] the 
distinctive features of republicanism and those of political liberalism” 
( Laden 2006 , 342). More strongly, Andrés De Francisco contends that 
appreciation of the core elements of political liberalism, and especially its 
ideal of free and equal citizenship, show that “Rawls is as republican as 
one can be” ( De Francisco 2006 , 287). 
 So is republicanism an  alternative to political liberalism? Or does polit-
ical liberalism (at least implicitly) include, or perhaps even rest upon, a 
commitment to non-domination? 
 In order to answer these questions, we need to distinguish between a 
“political” conception of non-domination and a “comprehensive” con-
ception. If we construe republican liberty as a comprehensive moral ideal, 
or as necessarily embedded within a particular comprehensive moral doc-
trine, 2 then it seems clear that republicanism is distinct from political lib-
eralism. But if we construe non-domination as a distinctly  political ideal, 
then political liberalism is thoroughly republican in nature. 
 In this paper I will outline a political conception of non-domination 
and propose that it is an integral part of political liberalism. The lat-
ter claim will be defended via an exploration of the kind of “citizen-
ship education” 3 that political liberalism mandates for all students. Such 
an education would impart to future citizens the skills and knowledge 
necessary for them to realize republican freedom vis-à-vis their political 
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institutions and workplaces. The limited scope of the political conception 
of non-domination, though, gives rise to the worry that it ignores rela-
tions of domination in certain kinds of associations, such as those within 
traditional religious communities. I address this worry by explaining that 
a political liberal citizenship education requires that all students learn 
that they have, among their rights of citizenship, an enforceable “right of 
exit” with respect to all associations in society, including religious com-
munities, and, moreover, that students learn how to exercise this right. 
 1.  Political Liberalism, Civic Respect, and the Political 
Conception of Persons 
 Citizens living in liberal societies, according to Rawls, invariably will 
subscribe to a variety of diff erent, typically incompatible, philosophi-
cal, moral, and religious “comprehensive doctrines.” (“Comprehensive 
doctrines” are philosophical, moral, and religious views—such as Bud-
dhism and utilitarianism—that apply to most or all aspects of persons’ 
lives.) Rawls calls this the “fact of reasonable pluralism” ( Rawls 2005 , 
441, 445). This pluralism would exist even in a fully just liberal society, 
and can be eliminated only through the exercise of political oppression 
( Rawls 2005 , 37). 
 In order to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism, Rawls 
holds that the main political and economic institutions of a liberal soci-
ety should be governed by a “political conception of justice.” A political 
conception of justice satisfi es what may be called the “basic structure 
restriction” and the “freestanding condition.” According to the basic 
structure restriction, a political conception of justice applies only to the 
basic structure of society—its main political and economic institutions, 
taken together as an overall system—and not to social, philosophical, or 
moral concerns that lie beyond this domain. 4 A political conception of 
justice satisfi es the freestanding condition by being formulated in terms 
of “purely political” ideas (concepts, principles, ideals, and values). Such 
political ideas do not presuppose the truth of any particular comprehen-
sive doctrine. Instead, they are compatible with, and ideally embedded 
within, 5 the diff erent comprehensive doctrines endorsed by that society’s 
citizens ( Rawls 2005 , 11–16, 374–76). 6
 One normative political idea of central importance within political lib-
eralism is that of citizens as “reasonable” and “rational” persons. Rea-
sonable persons, roughly, acknowledge the fact of reasonable pluralism, 
and share a commitment to satisfying what Rawls calls the “criterion 
of reciprocity” when justifying fundamental political decisions to one 
another ( Rawls 2005 , xliv, 16, 49–50, 54). The criterion of reciprocity is 
the “intrinsic (moral) political ideal” of political liberalism ( Rawls 2005 , 
xlv). In order to satisfy this criterion in their political relations with each 
other, citizens must justify their political proposals in terms that they 
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think that other citizens (at least those similarly committed to the crite-
rion of reciprocity) can accept. The reasonableness of persons expresses 
itself in what Rawls calls the fi rst “moral power” of citizens, namely, 
their capacity for a “sense of justice.” 7
 One way to understand how citizens can be reasonable persons and 
exercise eff ectively their sense of justice in their relations with one another 
is to see reasonableness as a form of mutual respect. Given its political 
nature, I  refer to this conception of mutual respect as “civic respect.” 
Civic respect has four features: 8
 1.  It is a condition of civic respect that citizens acknowledge the fact of 
reasonable pluralism. 
 2.  Civic respect is a form of what Stephen Darwall calls “recognition 
respect” ( Darwall 1995 , 2006). Recognition respect, roughly, is that 
respect which is owed to persons in virtue of some characteristic that 
they possess; this characteristic grants such persons a certain  stand-
ing in their relations with others. 9 Civic respect is a form of recogni-
tion respect that is owed to persons in virtue of their standing as free 
and equal citizens. One expresses such respect by taking this standing 
into account when deciding fundamental political questions in con-
cert with one’s fellow citizens. 10
 3.  Because civic respect is owed to persons qua citizens, it is limited in 
scope to relations among citizens within the basic structure of society. 11
 4.  The fourth feature of civic respect requires that citizens decide fun-
damental political questions—questions regarding “constitutional 
essentials” and “matters of basic justice” ( Rawls 2005 , 214–15, 
227–30, 235)—in a way that satisfi es the criterion of reciprocity, 
that is (given the fi rst three features of civic respect), in accordance 
with the idea of “public reason.” 
 “Public reason” is the name that Rawls gives to the shared form of rea-
soning that the citizens of a democratic society characterized by reason-
able pluralism should use when deciding fundamental political questions 
(constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice). According to 
Rawls, public reason should be understood as “part of the idea of democ-
racy itself” ( Rawls 2005 , 441). The terms of public reason are provided 
by the family of reasonable political conceptions of justice endorsed by 
citizens. 12 Public reason, then, endeavors to operate independently of 
particular comprehensive doctrines. 13 Political decisions concerning con-
stitutional essentials and matters of basic justice made by means of pub-
lic reason satisfy what Rawls calls the “liberal principle of legitimacy” 
( Rawls 2005 , xliv, 137). Such decisions consequently have normative 
authority for citizens ( Rawls 2005 , 19). This is because the public rea-
sons that justify those decisions are  acceptable to all reasonable citizens, 
even though they adhere to diff erent comprehensive doctrines. 
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 In addition to being reasonable, Rawls’s political conception of per-
sons characterize them as “rational.” Persons’ rational nature includes 
what Rawls refers to as their second moral power, namely, their capacity 
to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of the good. A  conception of 
the good “is an ordered family of fi nal ends and aims which specifi es a 
person’s conception of what is of value in human life or, alternatively, of 
what is regarded as a fully worthwhile life” ( Rawls 2001 , 19). 14 Rational 
persons, then, are (adequately) capable of determining what kinds of 
lives they judge to be of value for themselves, and pursuing or revising 
those determinations over the course of their lives. 
 According to political liberalism, the ability of persons to exercise 
eff ectively their two moral powers—their capacities for a sense of justice 
and a conception of the good—comprise their “higher-order interests” 
( Rawls 2005 , 74–75, 106). And while persons are characterized as both 
reasonable and rational, their reasonable nature (their sense of justice) is 
understood to  constrain their rational pursuit of their respective concep-
tions of the good. 15 This conception of the person, Rawls stresses, “is 
meant as both normative and political, not metaphysical or psychologi-
cal” ( Rawls 2001 , 19). The normative political conception of the person 
that is central to political liberalism does not rest upon any particular 
comprehensive doctrine, and thus is compatible with the fact of reason-
able pluralism. This means that it is a conception that can be accepted 
by citizens irrespective of which comprehensive doctrines they endorse. 
 I propose that the political conception of the person help guide liberal 
citizenship education. More precisely, my recommendation is that the 
political conception of persons as reasonable and rational be used to help 
determine the requirements of citizenship education in contemporary lib-
eral democratic societies characterized by reasonable pluralism. 16 I dis-
cuss these educational requirements in section 3. Before doing so, though, 
I will outline the main elements of the republican conception of freedom. 
 2. Republican Freedom 
 A person is free in the republican sense insofar as she is free from domi-
nation. An agent dominates or subjugates another agent insofar as the 
former enjoys the eff ective capacity to interfere “at will” with the deci-
sions and actions of the latter. More precisely, one agent ( A ) dominates 
another ( B ) if the following three conditions are satisfi ed ( Pettit 1997 , 
52): 
 1.  A has the power to interfere with  B . 
 2.  A can interfere with  B on an arbitrary basis, that is, in a way that 
need not “track the interests” of  B ( Pettit 1997 , 272). 17
 3.  A can interfere with  B in certain choices that  B is in a position to 
make. 
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 Importantly, the actual  exercise of dominating power by one agent over 
another is not necessary for domination to exist. “To the extent that 
I have a power of interfering without cost in your choice,” Pettit explains, 
“I count as dominating you” ( Pettit 2011 , 707). 
 The most extreme form of domination is the master-slave relationship. 
A master can interfere in any aspect of a slave’s life, with impunity, and 
such interference need not consider, let alone track, the interests of the 
slave. Generally, though, capacities to interfere will vary in degree or 
intensity, as dominating power is rarely absolute. Moreover, dominating 
power often is restricted to only certain spheres of life—its scope typi-
cally is limited. For instance, in traditional patriarchal marriages, hus-
bands dominate their wives, but this domination is not absolute, and 
does not extend beyond this relationship; such husbands may themselves 
be subject to domination by their employers in their workplaces. 
 A person enjoys republican freedom insofar as she is not subject to 
domination by other agents. Non-domination, according to Pettit, 
“involves the absence of domination in the presence of other people: it 
is a social ideal which requires that, though there are other people who 
might have been able to interfere with the person on an arbitrary basis, 
they are blocked from doing so” ( Pettit 1997 , 272). Agents are free in the 
republican sense, then, insofar as they possess and can exercise eff ectively 
institutional and social protections  against arbitrary interference. 18
 Pettit holds that freedom as non-domination can be distinguished from 
the kind of freedom that Isaiah Berlin calls “negative freedom,” that is, 
“freedom as non-interference” (see  Berlin 1969a ,  1969b ;  Pettit 2011 ). 
This is the kind of freedom that Pettit claims is endorsed by most liberal 
philosophers, including Rawls ( Pettit 1997 , 50, 111, 117;  2012 , 10–11). 
According to this account, roughly, freedom consists in opportunities or 
pathways for action, whether those opportunities or pathways are taken 
or not. “The sense of freedom, in which I use this term,” Berlin writes, 
“entails [. . .] the absence of obstacles to possible choices and activities—
absence of obstructions on roads along which a man can decide to walk” 
( Berlin 1969a , xxxix–xl). Interference by other agents (whether individu-
als or collective agents, including the state) can limit one’s negative lib-
erty by closing such opportunities for action (say, through the imposition 
of obstacles or constraints), or by intentionally making them less viable 
by attaching costs or penalties to them (say, by issuing threats). 
 To see that “non-interfering domination” is possible, imagine a “benev-
olent dictator.” This dictator does not interfere in most aspects of the 
lives of his subjects—that is, the dictator’s subjects enjoy a high degree 
of negative freedom, perhaps even more than that enjoyed by the citizens 
of a democratic society with many laws and regulations. But the dictator, 
unlike the state within a liberal democratic society, enjoys the  power to 
interfere arbitrarily, at will, with his subjects’ lives. So while the dicta-
tor may refrain from interfering actively in most aspects of the lives of 
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his subjects—the subjects may enjoy minimal interference in their daily 
lives—he nonetheless  dominates them in virtue of his overwhelming 
capacity to interfere at will, in ways unconstrained or uncontrolled by 
his subjects’ interests or powers. 
 One key diff erence between the conceptions of negative liberty and 
republican liberty concerns the question of whether  all interferences 
are constraints on an agent’s liberty. According to Berlin’s account of 
negative liberty, all interferences constitute restrictions on liberty. 19 Thus 
laws invariably  restrict a person’s liberty, as they prevent or impose costs 
(fi nes, imprisonment, and so forth) on certain courses of action, thereby 
limiting the range of options available to that person (or at least ren-
dering costly some options). 20 In contrast, republicans hold that not all 
interferences restrict liberty. “[I]nterference may occur without any dom-
ination,” according to Pettit, because “if the interference is not arbitrary 
then it will not dominate” ( Pettit 1997 , 272). 
 Recall the second condition of domination mentioned earlier:  A domi-
nates  B if  A can interfere with  B on an  arbitrary basis. Insofar as the 
exercise of power by  A over  B is compelled to track the interests of  B , 
that exercise is  not arbitrary. Preventing the exercise of power by  A over 
B , or ensuring that that exercise tracks adequately  B ’s interests, typically 
requires giving  B some way to check, infl uence, or control  A ’s exercise 
of power. Thus  B ’s republican liberty is not necessarily restricted by the 
exercise of power by  A over  B—non -arbitrary interference is possible. 
Non-arbitrary interferences in agents’ choices, such as those imposed by 
legitimate laws, are not restrictions on citizens’ freedom, 21 at least under-
stood in the republican way. 
 3.  Political Liberal Citizenship Education and 
Republican Freedom 
 Would a citizenship education based upon political liberalism foster in 
students the knowledge and skills necessary for them to be able to enjoy 
and exercise republican liberty? According to Pettit’s understanding 
of Rawlsian political liberalism, there is no guarantee that this would 
be the case. This is because, as noted earlier, Pettit holds that Rawls 
employs Berlin’s negative notion of liberty in his political writings. This 
claim, though, is not correct. The concept of liberty that Rawls in fact 
employs is that of the “triadic relation” formulated by  Gerald G. Mac-
Callum (1967 ). According to this concept, Rawls notes, “any liberty can 
be explained by a reference to three items: the agents who are free, the 
restrictions or limitations which they are free from, and what it is that 
they are free to do or not to do” ( Rawls 1999 , 177). 22 Diff erent “concep-
tions” of liberty specify the three items that comprise the “concept” of 
liberty in diff erent ways. 23 Applying this concept of liberty to political 
liberalism, the agents in question are citizens, understood as reasonable 
15032-2380d-d-1pass-r02.indd   140 3/20/2019   9:23:24 PM
Non-Domination and Citizenship Education 141
and rational persons, and what it is that they are free to do—or should 
be free to do—is to exercise their two moral powers, their capacities for 
an eff ective sense of justice and a conception of the good. The restrictions 
or limitations from which citizens should be free are interferences or con-
straints on citizens’ exercise of those powers. 24 So a political liberal citi-
zenship education would teach students the skills, concepts, and virtues 
necessary for them to  become capable of exercising eff ectively the two 
moral powers upon reaching adulthood, that is, to become reasonable 
and rational persons. 
 Teaching students how to become reasonable persons would require 
teaching them to understand and appreciate the fact of reasonable plu-
ralism and the criterion of reciprocity—and, consequently, to employ 
the terms of public reason when helping to decide fundamental politi-
cal questions. In other words, a political liberal citizenship education 
would teach students the skills and concepts necessary for them to be 
able to interact with others on the basis of civic respect. 25 And teaching 
students how to be rational persons would involve (inter alia) ensuring 
that they are aware of the diverse range of conceptions of the good and 
comprehensive doctrines that exist in their society, that they know how 
to exercise their rights and liberties, especially with respect to forming, 
revising, and pursuing their conceptions of the good, and that they pos-
sess suffi  cient knowledge and skills to be economically independent as 
adults, so that they need not be dependent on others in order to pursue 
their conceptions of the good. 
 Would a political liberal citizenship education with these goals pro-
mote a capacity for republican freedom in future citizens? If we construe 
republican freedom as a  political ideal, then a political liberal citizenship 
education unavoidably would aim at realizing republican freedom for all 
citizens. 
 To understand the distinction between a political conception of non-
domination and a comprehensive conception, consider fi rst Rawls’s 
distinction between “political” autonomy and “comprehensive” or 
“ethical” autonomy. Rawls claims that political autonomy and ethi-
cal autonomy are philosophically distinct ideas. According to politi-
cal liberalism, citizens must enjoy “full political autonomy.” This 
form of autonomy, Rawls explains, is “the legal independence and 
assured political integrity of citizens and their sharing with other citi-
zens equally in the exercise of political power” ( Rawls 2005 , xliv). 26
Understood in this way, political autonomy can be distinguished from 
an ethical or comprehensive conception of autonomy that applies 
to the whole of life, both social and individual. So while political 
liberalism “affi  rms political autonomy for all,” Rawls claims that it 
“leaves the weight of ethical autonomy to be decided by citizens sev-
erally in light of their comprehensive doctrines” ( Rawls 2005 , 78). 
Political autonomy can be distinguished from ethical autonomy by 
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its compliance with political liberalism’s freestanding condition and 
basic structure restriction. 
 The distinction between political and ethical autonomy has educational 
implications. In  Political Liberalism , Rawls briefl y considers the scope of 
the “requirements the state can impose” on the education of children 
belonging to “religious sects [that] oppose the culture of the modern 
world and wish to lead their common life apart from its unwanted infl u-
ences.” “Comprehensive” liberal approaches to education, he explains, 
“may lead to requirements designed to foster the values of autonomy 
and individuality.” By contrast, “political liberalism has a diff erent aim 
and requires far less” (Rawls 2005,  1999 ). A political liberal citizenship 
education aims at ensuring that all future citizens can enjoy and exercise 
political autonomy. 27
 A similar distinction can be made between a political conception of 
non-domination and a comprehensive conception. The political concep-
tion of republican liberty satisfi es the freestanding condition, as it can 
be understood as part of the political conception of the person, and 
thus compatible with the diff erent reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
endorsed by citizens. 28 And the political conception of republican free-
dom is limited in its scope to citizens’ relations within the basic structure 
of society. A comprehensive conception of non-domination, in contrast, 
is based upon a particular comprehensive doctrine and/or applies to all 
domains of persons’ lives. 29
 A political liberal citizenship education would promote a capacity to 
enjoy and exercise the political conception of republican freedom within 
future citizens in three main ways. 30
 First, as already noted, a political liberal citizenship education would 
teach students how to be politically autonomous. 31 One aspect of such an 
education would involve teaching students about their political rights and 
liberties, including how to exercise them eff ectively once they become full 
citizens. 32 Such knowledge would promote relations of non-domination 
vis-à-vis the state and its various institutions and agents. In particular, a 
political liberal citizenship education would aim at ensuring that students 
know not only how to exercise their rights as citizens, but specifi cally 
how to do so in order to  challenge the exercise of power by political insti-
tutions and agents. This means that students would be taught how the 
legal system of their society works, including its political system, what 
criteria political decisions and actions must satisfy in order for them to be 
legitimate and fair, what resources are available to citizens to challenge 
political decisions, and so forth. 33
 Another aspect of a political liberal citizenship education for political 
autonomy involves cultivating in students a capacity and a willingness 
to interact with other citizens on the basis of civic respect. 34 Specifi cally, 
students would be taught how to employ the terms of public reason when 
deciding fundamental political questions, as well as how to challenge 
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political decisions that are not made in terms of public reason. The idea 
of public reason supports the ideal of non-domination by requiring that 
fundamental political decisions be made on the basis of reasons  accept-
able to all reasonable persons. Hence such decisions must “track” ade-
quately the interests of all persons aff ected by them. The requirements of 
public reason help secure political non-domination. 
 One pedagogic strategy for teaching students how to interact with oth-
ers on the basis of civic respect involves requiring them to participate in 
class debates concerning a range of politically fundamental but divisive 
issues. 35 These issues could be both historical, concerning pivotal issues 
in the political history of their society, and contemporary in nature. With 
respect to the latter, students might debate the political justifi cations in 
support of and against, say, the right to abortion, the legal recognition of 
same-sex marriages, the provision of a basic income for all citizens, the 
fi nancing of political campaigns, the right to voluntary euthanasia, the 
right of citizens to wear religious clothing or symbols as public offi  cers or 
during public ceremonies, and so forth. 
 After explaining to students that they live in a society characterized 
by persistent disagreement over a wide range of religious and moral 
 questions—that is, a society characterized by reasonable pluralism—the 
rules of the debate would be introduced. The key rule would be that 
students formulate any argument concerning a fundamental political 
issue in a manner that respects the limits of public reason by not relying 
on any particular comprehensive doctrine. Arguments that violate the 
limits of public reason, by violating either the freestanding condition or 
the basic structure restriction, would be ruled inadmissible. Indeed, stu-
dents would be encouraged to rise on “points of order” in order to help 
them identify such arguments, and learn to explain to others why they 
are inadmissible. Through participation in such debates, students would 
learn how to employ public reason justifi cations when deciding funda-
mental political questions. 36
 A political liberal citizenship education with such pedagogic exercises 
would help encourage students to regard and interact with their political 
system as a kind of “contestatory democracy.” A contestatory democ-
racy, according to Pettit, should be understood as based “on the con-
testability by the people of everything that government does.” “[T]he 
important thing,” he maintains, “to ensure is that governmental doings 
are fi t to survive popular contestation” ( Pettit 1997 , 277). 37 Moreover, 
a contestatory democracy is a political order that is (inter alia) delibera-
tive and inclusive in nature. It is deliberative in that political decisions 
should be based upon considerations of common concern, which provide 
the grounds for citizens’ challenges to government decisions and actions, 
and it is inclusive in that all citizens have adequate opportunities and 
resources to make such challenges (see  Pettit 1997 , ch. 6). The pedagogic 
strategy of employing practice political debates in citizenship classes is 
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supportive of this ideal. This is because such exercises would foster in 
students a capacity to evaluate critically, and if necessary debate and 
challenge, political decisions. Moreover, practice political debates and 
similar activities might help foster over time a general public political 
culture that is both deliberative and inclusive in nature. 38
 A second element of a political liberal citizenship education that would 
foster within students a capacity for republican freedom concerns the 
economic domain of society, and specifi cally relations amongst citizens 
within workplaces. All students, according to Rawls, should be taught 
the skills and knowledge necessary for them to become “economically 
independent and self-supporting members of society over a complete 
life” ( Rawls 2005 , 200). Such an education would involve preparing stu-
dents for a range of occupations or kinds of employment upon reaching 
adulthood, ensure that they can compete fairly for positions and offi  ces 
of authority, and so forth. The skills and knowledge imparted by a politi-
cal liberal citizenship education would help ensure that future citizens 
are not  dependent upon any particular employer or form of employ-
ment. The capacity of future employers to exercise domination over their 
employees thereby would be reduced (or, ideally, eliminated). 39
 Moreover, a political liberal citizenship education would ensure that 
all future citizens acquire knowledge of their economic rights, including 
knowledge of how to exercise eff ectively those rights. Students would be 
taught about their rights to personal property and to freedom of con-
tract, as well as the limits of those rights. They also would be taught 
how to compete for positions and offi  ces of authority and responsibil-
ity within both the public and private sectors of society. Part of learn-
ing about the latter right includes acquiring the knowledge necessary to 
challenge unjust hiring decisions. Students also would learn how to avail 
themselves of the basic resources and opportunities to which they are 
entitled as free and equal citizens (according to any reasonable concep-
tion of justice). 40 In short, a political liberal citizenship education would 
ensure that citizens are capable of enjoying and exercising republican 
freedom in the economic domain of their lives. 
 A third element of a political liberal citizenship education that would 
promote a capacity for republican liberty within future citizens concerns 
citizens’ rights with respect to associations and relationships. A politi-
cal liberal citizenship education would teach students how to assert and 
exercise their rights and liberties, upon reaching adulthood, in their rela-
tions with other citizens, as well as vis-à-vis the various non-state institu-
tions and associations to which they belong, or with which they interact 
in some signifi cant way, such as households, fi rms, clubs, and religious 
organizations. Such an education would provide future citizens with suf-
fi cient knowledge of how to call upon the institutions of the state in 
order to enforce their rights—especially those rights that protect citizens’ 
freedom of association, conscience, movement, and occupation—against 
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attempts by others to exercise arbitrary power over them. Of central 
importance here is citizens’ “right of exit” with respect to  any associa-
tion or relationship (that is not part of the basic structure). 41 This kind of 
knowledge is necessary for citizens to be able to exercise eff ectively their 
two moral powers, and especially their capacity to form, revise, and pur-
sue their conceptions of the good. This knowledge also provides citizens 
with a resource by means of which they can avoid being subject to the 
dominating power of non-state agents, including other citizens. 42
 Finally, I should note that I have summarized here only the  require-
ments of a political liberal citizenship education. Nothing within this 
account prohibits classes and other educational activities that, for 
instance, encourage students to explore critically diff erent comprehensive 
doctrines, including religious views, or that assist students in acquiring 
and exercising a form of ethical autonomy. Such courses and activities, 
though, must be  optional , as requiring them of all students would fail to 
accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism. 
 4.  The Limits of Political Liberalism vis-à-vis 
Non-Domination 
 In this section, I consider a limit on the potential of a political liberal 
citizenship education to promote republican freedom within future citi-
zens. Recall that a political conception of justice applies only to the basic 
structure of society. This feature of political liberalism limits what the 
state can do with respect to relations of domination in those associa-
tions that are  not part of the basic structure, such as traditional religious 
communities. Many religious communities assign diff erent roles to men 
and women, and confer upon the roles occupied by men greater author-
ity and power than those occupied by women. The asymmetrical gender 
relations within traditional patriarchal religious communities, then, may 
be relations of domination, and hence republican un-freedom. Children 
raised in such communities, moreover, may come to  internalize these 
views and practices, believing that relations of domination based upon 
gender are justifi ed, and subsequently reproduce such relations as adults 
(see  Okin 2002 ). 43
 How signifi cantly does the basic structure restriction of political lib-
eralism limit the realization of republican liberty? Alternatively, to what 
extent (if any) can domination within associations coexist with the reali-
zation of the political conception of republican liberty for all citizens? 
There are two considerations that should inform our assessment of the 
extent to which political liberalism permits the existence of relations of 
domination within associations outside of the basic structure. 
 First, it is important to stress that all associations within society, 
including religious institutions and communities, must  comply with the 
requirements of the basic structure. No association can violate the rights 
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and liberties of citizens. So the basic structure imposes constraints on 
all associations and practices within society. “Firms and labour unions, 
churches, universities, and the family are bound by constraints arising 
from the principles of justice,” Rawls writes, “but these constraints arise 
indirectly from the just background institutions within which associa-
tions and groups exist, and by which the conduct of their members is 
restricted” ( Rawls 2001 , 10). Religious associations, then, cannot under-
mine the free and equal status of their members qua citizens, say, by pro-
hibiting women from voting or running for political offi  ce, or by treating 
heresy and apostasy as punishable crimes. 44 These are legitimate, coer-
cively enforced, constraints on religious associations. Likewise, religious 
associations must respect their members’ right of exit. 
 Second, recall that the requirements of citizenship education apply 
to  all members of society (see  Rawls 2005 , 199). 45 Fulfi lling this educa-
tional goal requires public action. Ensuring that future citizens are free 
and equal is one that the state, representing the political community as 
a whole, must secure by legally coercive means if necessary. Roughly, 
the state ought to require by law that parents enroll their children in 
educational institutions that will prepare them to be free citizens, persons 
capable of exercising eff ectively the two moral powers upon reaching 
adulthood. 46
 Two features of such an education should be noted with respect to the 
cultivation of a capacity for republican freedom in students. First, the 
kind of citizenship education that political liberalism would mandate for 
all students would teach them to distinguish between those institutions 
that are components of their society’s basic structure and those insti-
tutions and associations that are  not parts of the basic structure. The 
latter includes, of course, the religious organizations and cultural com-
munities to which students might belong. Second, with respect to those 
institutions, associations, and communities that are not constituents of 
the basic structure, students would be taught about their rights, includ-
ing their right of exit, so that they will be capable of exercising this right 
eff ectively upon reaching adulthood. 47 Moreover, students will be taught 
that the right of exit is  enforceable (that as citizens they can call upon the 
power of the state to stop, coercively if necessary, any attempt by any 
individual or association to interfere with their exercise of this right). 
Students, in addition, would be taught that the right of exit applies to 
households. 48 Knowledge of their society’s divorce laws—as well as those 
institutions, laws, and policies that aim to promote and protect gender 
equality amongst citizens—would help reduce signifi cantly the potential 
for one spouse to exercise dominating power over the other. 49
 What exactly teaching students about their right of exit with respect to 
the associations that are not part of the basic structure would involve is a 
diffi  cult question that I cannot answer here. Any answer, though, would 
depend upon the society in question. My claim simply is that an adequate 
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political liberal citizenship education would ensure that all future citizens, 
irrespective of gender or religious affi  liation, know  how to exercise eff ec-
tively their right of exit vis-à-vis any association that is not part of the 
basic structure. An eff ective and enforceable right of exit would constrain 
signifi cantly the ability of associations, such as religious institutions and 
communities, to exercise dominating power vis-à-vis their members. 
 With respect to citizenship education, however, it must be acknowl-
edged that a political liberal approach can go only so far in promoting 
republican freedom in the lives of students. While a political liberal citi-
zenship education would require that  all students acquire the knowledge 
and skills necessary for them to be able to exercise eff ectively their right 
of exit as adults with respect to  any association to which they belong, 
including hierarchical religious ones, it cannot legitimately aim at the 
elimination of hierarchical relations within such associations. In contrast, 
a citizenship education committed to promoting a comprehensive con-
ception of republican freedom would not necessarily regard the promo-
tion of such freedom within  all aspects of students’ lives to be morally 
problematic; indeed, such promotion may be a central pedagogic goal of 
a comprehensive republican citizenship education. 50
 Yet imposing a citizenship education that  aims at promoting compre-
hensive republican liberty would itself, I  think, be a form of domina-
tion. This is because such promotion would involve the exercise of state 
power in the service of a partisan moral ideal, a moral ideal not shared 
by all reasonable citizens. In other words, state promotion of republican 
liberty in all aspects of students’ lives involves the exercise of political 
power in order to reduce the scope of reasonable pluralism (the range 
of comprehensive doctrines and associated conceptions of the good that 
citizens can adopt and pursue within their lives). Perhaps tragically, then, 
a citizenship education that aims at promoting within students a capacity 
to enjoy and exercise  either political or comprehensive republican lib-
erty cannot avoid permitting or employing some measure of dominating 
power in society. 51
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter I  tried to show that a distinctly political conception of 
non-domination is an integral part of political liberalism. My discussion 
proceeded through consideration of the kind of citizenship education that 
political liberalism mandates for all students. Such an education would 
impart to future citizens the skills and knowledge necessary for them 
to realize republican freedom vis-à-vis their political institutions, their 
workplaces, and, by means of an enforceable right of exit, the various 
associations to which they might belong (including religious communi-
ties). Whether one prefers the political conception of non-domination 
that I defend here or a comprehensive version likely refl ects whether one 
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is committed to accommodating the reasonable pluralism characteristic 
of contemporary societies. However, to choose  not to accommodate this 
pluralism, I think, itself expresses a “dominating” stance with respect to 
many reasonable citizens’ comprehensive doctrines. 52
 Notes 
 1  I focus on Pettit’s conception of republican freedom in this chapter (Pettit 
1996, 1997 , 2011 , 2012 ). For an overview of contemporary republican 
views, see Lovett 2014. (I use “non-domination,” “republican liberty,” and 
“republican freedom” interchangeably in my discussion.) 
 2  Pettit’s version of republicanism, for instance, can be read as presupposing a 
form of consequentialism and as applying to citizens’ social relations in gen-
eral. It is not entirely clear, though, that it is in fact properly understood as 
a comprehensive (or partially comprehensive) view. Nevertheless, it is not as 
unambiguously “political” in nature as Rawls’s version of liberalism. My aim 
in section 3 is to outline an explicitly  political (non-comprehensive) version 
of republican freedom. (My thanks to Lars Moen for bringing this ambiguity 
in Pettit’s version of republicanism to my attention.) 
 3  I refer to “citizenship education” instead of “civic education” in this chapter. 
“Civic education” often is construed to refer narrowly to the teaching of 
how the political institutions of society work, as well as citizens’ rights and 
duties with respect to those institutions. “Citizenship education,” as I use 
the term here, includes not only civic education so understood, but also the 
teaching of the skills and knowledge necessary for students to participate as 
free and equal citizens in  all aspects of their society’s “basic structure” (see 
section 1), including its economic structure, as well as the various political 
virtues important for democratic citizenship. 
 4  I defend (a version of) the basic structure restriction in Neufeld and Van Sch-
oelandt 2014. 
 5  Rawls suggests that a political conception of justice can be understood as 
a “module” that can be integrated into citizens’ comprehensive doctrines 
(Rawls 2005, 12–13, 145). (Such integration may require modifi cations in 
citizens’ comprehensive doctrines.) 
 6  A third feature of a political conception of justice (not relevant to my discus-
sion here) is that its freestanding political ideas are “seen as implicit in the 
public political culture of a democratic society” (Rawls 2005, 13). 
 7  “The capacity for a sense of justice,” Rawls explains, “is the capacity to 
understand, to apply, and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) 
the principles of political justice that specify the fair terms of social coopera-
tion” (Rawls 2001, 18–19). 
 8  This account draws upon Neufeld 2005. 
 9  A diff erent kind of respect, “appraisal respect,” “consists in a positive 
appraisal of a person or his qualities [. . .] Appraisal respect is the positive 
appraisal itself” (Darwall 1995, 184). Appraisal respect can be distinguished 
from recognition respect in that we might think that equal recognition respect 
is owed to persons for whom we have little or considerable appraisal respect. 
 10  This is not to say that a form of mutual respect does not apply to non- 
citizens as well. At the very least, the basic human rights of all persons must 
be respected irrespective of citizenship, and respect for others’ human rights 
involves a form of recognition respect. However, since citizens exercise politi-
cal sovereignty over each other (see Rawls 2005, 136, 214, 445), a more 
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robust form of mutual recognition respect should govern their relations (or so 
I shall assume for the purposes of this chapter). (My thanks to Colin Macleod 
for pressing me to clarify this point.) 
 11  Civic respect, then, does not violate the basic structure restriction, and thus 
can be distinguished from other, more “comprehensive” forms of recognition 
respect, such as that required by Kant’s “Formula of Humanity” (Kant 1998, 
36–43). (Civic respect, of course, is  compatible with comprehensive Kantian 
recognition respect.) 
 12  A “reasonable” conception of justice possesses three features (Rawls 2005, 
450). First, it secures equally for all citizens a set of “basic liberties.” (For the 
set of basic liberties secured by Rawls’s conception of “justice as fairness,” 
see Rawls 2001, 44, 2005 , 291.) Second, it assigns to the basic liberties a 
“special priority” vis-à-vis other political principles and values (e.g., welfare). 
Third, it assures for all citizens adequate resources for them to exercise eff ec-
tively their basic liberties over the course of their lives. A reasonable political 
conception of justice, then, is a conception that includes these three features, 
as well as satisfying the basic structure restriction and the freestanding con-
dition. Rawls holds that his egalitarian conception of justice—“justice as 
fairness”—is “the most reasonable conception because it best satisfi es these 
conditions” (Rawls 2005, xlvi). 
 13  When citizens decide fundamental political questions on the basis of public 
reason, they realize their “duty of civility” (Rawls 2005, 444). 
 14  Furthermore: “[t]he elements of such a conception are normally set within, 
and interpreted by, certain comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
doctrines in light of which the various ends and aims are ordered and 
understood.” 
 15  For more on the ideas of the reasonable and the rational, see: Rawls 2001, 
6–7, 81–82, 191. 
 16  Rawls’s political conception of the person underpins his conception of justice 
as fairness and his use of “ideal theory” in formulating and defending that 
conception. (On ideal theory, see: Rawls 1999, 7–8, 215–16, 308–09, 2001 , 
13, 65–66, 2005 , 285. For an account of the relation between the ideas of 
public reason and ideal theory within political liberalism, see Neufeld 2017.) 
However, I think that the account of citizenship education that I outline here 
can be accepted  irrespective of whether one endorses Rawls’s specifi c concep-
tion of justice and/or his account of ideal theory. Even if readers reject ideal 
theory and/or justice as fairness, they nonetheless may fi nd the political con-
ception of the person to be an attractive ideal, an ecumenical yet compelling 
account of what it is to be a free citizen within a pluralist society, and thus 
one that should be part of citizenship education. 
 17  What constitutes “arbitrary” power of interference is a topic of debate 
amongst republican theorists (see Lovett 2014, section 2.2 for a helpful over-
view). I favor a “proceduralist” account according to which, roughly, non-
arbitrary power is power that is constrained and regulated by publicly known 
rules and goals (Lovett 2012). In his recent work, Pettit has tried to dispense 
with references to “arbitrary power” altogether and instead focus on “uncon-
trolled” capacities for interference (Pettit 2012, 49–58). This approach, 
though, has been challenged as implausible (see Simpson 2017 ). 
 18  Moreover, like (most) relations of domination, relations of non-domination 
typically are common knowledge. Indeed, such common knowledge ensures 
(greater) equality of freedom among citizens. (Pettit 1997, 273.) 
 19  As we shall see in the next section, this is not the case with Rawls’s account 
of liberty. 
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 20  Such limits on negative liberty may very well be justifi ed, or even necessary 
to better secure persons’ overall negative liberty (consider, for instance, laws 
against assault and murder). Berlin employs a “non-moralized” account of 
negative liberty. (A “moralized” account of liberty, roughly, would not cat-
egorize prohibitions on immoral or unjust actions as genuine constraints on 
persons’ liberty.) In contrast, Pettit’s conception of republican liberty, at least 
its earlier formulations (Pettit 1996, 1997 ), is a  moralized conception (see 
List and Valentini 2016). 
 21  This is one of the more controversial aspects of Pettit’s account of republican 
liberty. For criticism see: Ferejohn 2001; Talisse 2014 ; and List and Valentini 
2016. 
 22  Rawls notes that he “follows” MacCallum in this respect (Rawls 1999, 177, 
n.4). 
 23  On the distinction between “concepts” and “conceptions,” which Rawls 
claims to have derived from H.L.A. Hart, see Rawls 1999, 5. 
 24  “The basic liberties,” Rawls explains, “are a framework of legally protected 
paths and opportunities” (Rawls 2005, 325). These “legally protected paths 
and opportunities” are those that enable citizens to exercise their sense of 
justice and their capacity to form, revise, and pursue conceptions of the good 
free from interferences from  other agents, including collective agents such as 
fi rms, religious associations, and the state. 
 25  Most versions of comprehensive liberalism also are committed to teaching 
students how to interact with others on the basis of mutual respect (e.g., Gut-
mann 1995). However, the conception of civic respect that I have attributed 
to political liberalism diff ers from (most) comprehensive liberal conceptions 
of mutual respect in virtue of political liberalism’s distinctive commitment to 
the freestanding condition and the basic structure restriction (see Davis and 
Neufeld 2007). 
 26  Elsewhere, Rawls writes that political autonomy “is realized in public life by 
affi  rming the political principles of justice and enjoying the protections of the 
basic rights and liberties; it is also realized by participating in society’s pub-
lic aff airs and sharing in its collective self-determination over time” (Rawls 
2005, 77–78). The conception of civic respect outlined in section 1 helps 
explain  how politically autonomous citizens can share in society’s “collec-
tive self-determination over time,” namely, by helping to decide fundamental 
political questions together on the basis of public reason. 
 27  This is not to deny that teaching students to become politically autono-
mous might lead some (or many) students to come to value and exercise 
ethical autonomy in the other aspects of their lives—a possibility that Rawls 
acknowledges (Rawls 2005, 199–200; for further discussion see Davis and 
Neufeld 2007). 
 28  It may seem that Rawls makes a similar point himself: “Since classical repub-
licanism does not involve a comprehensive doctrine, it is [.  .  .] fully com-
patible with political liberalism” (Rawls 2001, 144). However, by “classical 
republicanism” Rawls does not refer to something like Pettit’s notion of 
freedom as non-domination. Rather, Rawls has in mind citizens’ exercise of 
political autonomy. 
 29  Whether Pettit’s version of republicanism should be understood as a compre-
hensive or partially comprehensive view is unclear (see n. 2). My aim here is 
to make explicit what a  political conception of republican freedom would 
look like. 
 30  Just as teaching students how to exercise political autonomy may lead some 
to endorse an ideal of ethical autonomy in areas of their lives beyond the basic 
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structure (see n. 27), so too teaching students the concepts and skills neces-
sary for “political” non-domination may lead some to endorse a “compre-
hensive” version. Such “spillover eff ects” may be unavoidable, but they fail 
to remove the distinction—in both theory and practice—between the political 
and comprehensive conceptions of these ideas. (My thanks to Michael Barnes 
for discussion of this point.) 
 31  Laden points out that political liberalism’s concern with securing the politi-
cal autonomy of citizens prevents the exercise of arbitrary power by the state 
with respect to them (see Laden 2006 , 354). 
 32  Rawls holds that, given society’s concern with students’ “role as future citi-
zens,” students must acquire “the capacity to understand the public culture 
and participate in its institutions” (Rawls 2005, 200). 
 33  Of course, the institutional resources available to citizens for challenging 
political decisions often are inadequate within  existing liberal democratic 
societies. Such societies, after all, are not well-ordered societies (see n. 16). 
Nonetheless, a citizenship education that cultivates in students within non-
ideal circumstances the capacity to form and act upon a sense of justice 
would impart to them the skills and knowledge necessary to make use of 
what resources  are available to them to challenge those political decisions 
with which they disagree, as well as to promote the policies and institutions 
that they think are required by justice. Such an education, then, likely would 
contribute to the  improvement of the political and legal institutions of stu-
dents’ societies, as their capacity to act upon their sense of justice would 
enable them to help improve the justice of those institutions. This is one 
important way in which citizenship education can play a role with respect to 
transitional justice. 
 34  Such an education would be part of “developing the political virtues” within 
future citizens (Rawls 2005, 200). 
 35  This example is discussed in Davis and Neufeld 2007; and Neufeld 2013. It 
realizes (at least) two of the six pedagogic practices—“Deliberations of cur-
rent, controversial issues,” and “Simulations of adult civic roles”—identifi ed 
by Levine and Kawashima-Ginsberg (2017, 4) as proven to be eff ective with 
respect to civic learning. 
 36  Some critics of the idea of public reason hold that it imposes unfair burdens 
upon citizens of faith (and in this context, students of faith). This is because 
such citizens often fi nd it necessary to draw upon their religious views in 
order to decide certain fundamental political questions (for instance, whether 
abortion or physician-assisted suicide should be legally permitted), and fi nd it 
diffi  cult or even impossible to off er public reasons for their positions. Moreo-
ver, to the extent that religious citizens might try to provide public reasons, 
their “integrity” may be threatened, as the reasons that such citizens take to 
be the most important ones applicable to certain issues may  confl ict with the 
available public reasons concerning those issues. (E.g., see: Wolterstorff  1997; 
and Vallier 2012.) I cannot reply to this line of criticism here, except to note 
that I think that the kind of “compartmentalization” that the idea of pub-
lic reason  may require of some citizens with respect to their comprehensive 
views (including their religious beliefs) need not be “integrity-threatening” 
in nature (see Davis and Neufeld 2007, section 3). For a robust response to 
this line of criticism, in support of Rawlsian public reason, see Watson and 
Hartley 2018 , ch. 4. 
 37  “The emerging conception of democracy insists that the point is to create a 
testing environment of selection for laws, rather than to have laws that are 
consensually designed” (Pettit 1997, 278). 
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 38  Rawls describes the conception of political self-government based upon the 
idea of public reason as a form of “deliberative democracy” (Rawls 2005, 
448–50). Does Pettit’s contrast between a conception of democracy that is 
“contestatory” in nature and one that is “consensual” indicate an important 
diff erence with Rawls’s deliberative conception of democracy? I do not think 
that it does. Shared acceptance of the terms of public reason does  not require 
or presuppose that all reasonable citizens endorse the  particular laws that are 
enacted by their political representatives (as Rawls remarks, “unanimity of 
views is not to be expected” [Rawls 2005, 479].) Pettit himself describes a 
Rawlsian well-ordered society as a “civicity”: a form of social organization 
that is neither a unifi ed corporate entity nor an aggregation of disparate indi-
viduals (Pettit 2006). 
 39  Of course, realizing non-domination within workplaces requires (much) 
more than education (see Anderson 2017). 
 40  These resources and opportunities are “all-purpose means” (including, inter 
alia, income and wealth) necessary for citizens to exercise eff ectively their 
two moral powers. Again,  existing liberal democratic societies may secure 
inadequate resources for citizens in this respect, but a political liberal citizen-
ship education that inculcates in students a capacity for an eff ective sense of 
justice would enable future citizens to act to make the basic structures of their 
societies  more just, including the adequate provision of all-purpose means for 
citizens to exercise their basic liberties. 
 41  The right of exit is a core element of citizens’ freedom of association, a free-
dom that must be realized institutionally within any minimally just liberal 
society. 
 42  While I focus on the right of exit in securing non-domination in this chapter, 
other rights, such as those protecting liberty of conscience and freedom of 
speech, also are important in promoting citizens’ republican freedom. Such 
rights help ensure that citizens have a “voice” with respect to the associations 
to which they belong. Citizens within a liberal society, then, can try to coun-
ter or alter relations of domination within associations through criticism and 
debate. I focus on the right of exit here, though, as I take it to be the  ultimate
institutional protector of republican liberty in a pluralist liberal society. (My 
thanks to Lori Watson for discussion of this point.) 
 43  Hence Okin is critical of Rawlsian political liberalism for its refusal to con-
demn as “unreasonable” the gendered views and practices of many tradi-
tional religious communities (Okin 1994 , 31f, 2005 , 241–42). 
 44  For Rawls’s use of these examples, see Rawls 2001, 11, 164. 
 45  Such an education may indirectly encourage the revision of elements of stu-
dents’ comprehensive doctrines so that they are compatible with or support-
ive of liberal rights and the idea of public reason (see n. 5). (Thanks to Lori 
Watson for this point.) 
 46  While the state  ultimately would be responsible for ensuring that children 
received such an education, non-state institutions could be the relevant edu-
cation providers, so long as they satisfi ed appropriate, legally enforced, edu-
cational requirements (see Davis and Neufeld 2007). 
 47  As noted earlier (n. 42), other rights also can help to combat domination 
within associations by giving citizens a “voice” with respect to internal life 
of those associations. The right of exit, though, serves as the ultimate institu-
tional protector of republican freedom. 
 48  Rawls includes families within his account of the basic structure (Rawls 
2005, 258). Yet in his discussions of  how political principles of justice apply 
to families, he treats them in the same way as those “voluntary associations” 
that he explicitly identifi es as  not part of the basic structure (e.g., Rawls 2001, 
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10). I address this feature of Rawlsian political liberalism—and attempt to 
provide a solution, according to which (roughly)  aspects of households are 
directly subject to principles of justice—in Neufeld 2009; and Neufeld and 
Van Schoelandt 2014. 
 49  Existing political societies generally do not secure (adequately) the free and 
equal status of women qua citizens within their basic structures. Rawls 
acknowledges that securing the freedom and equality of women qua citizens 
requires revising existing unjust laws, including divorce laws (Rawls 2001, 
167). For further discussion of this issue, see Neufeld 2009; and Hartley and 
Watson 2010. 
 50  Of course, republicans can allow that there may be practical considerations, 
or other important values, that weigh against acting on such an educational 
aim in many circumstances. 
 51  A political liberal might claim here that  if a person chooses to remain a mem-
ber of a hierarchical association (roughly, that person knows how to exercise 
eff ectively the right of exit but  chooses not to do so),  then that association 
does not dominate that person. This is because that person’s interests  are
being adequately “tracked” by remaining a member of the association in 
question (if this were not so, the person would have left the association). 
While this response is partially successful, I  think, in reducing the practi-
cal diff erences between the political and comprehensive conceptions of non-
domination, it leaves out the possibility that a person might remain a member 
of an association that subjects her to domination because of her  other values 
and commitments (say, ties to families and communities, religious convic-
tions, and so forth). While persons who remain members of such associations 
may use their rights to try to reform those associations, there obviously is no 
guarantee that such eff orts will be successful. Such persons thus may choose 
to remain “unfree,” in the republican sense,  despite their right of exit. (My 
thanks to Elizabeth Edenberg and Andrew Franklin-Hall for helpful discus-
sion of this point.) 
 52  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at: the Association for Legal and 
Social Philosophy (Queen’s University, UK, 2012); the Centre for Ethics (Uni-
versity of Toronto, Canada, 2015); the International Conference on Aff ective, 
Moral, and Civic Education (Université de Montréal, Canada, 2015); and the 
Manchester Centre for Political Theory (MANCEPT) workshop on “Liberal 
Neutrality and Oppression” (Manchester University, UK, 2017). My thanks 
to the participants at those presentations and workshops for their questions 
and comments. I  especially would like to thank: Michael Barnes, Simone 
Chambers, Jürgen De Wispelaere, Elizabeth Edenberg, Andrew Franklin-
Hall, Carol Hay, Joseph Heath, Waheed Hussain, Colin MacLeod, Emily 
McGill, Lars Moen, and Lori Watson. 
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